Athena · see the system
See Every Risk. Understand Every Exposure. Prove Every Decision.
Discovery capability families
Checks grouped by the question they answer.
Web injectionCan input reach something it should not?
- Reflected XSS, error-based SQL injection, command injection and template RCE
- SSRF, in-band XXE, header injection, directory traversal and open redirect
- Named gaps: blind, stored, out-of-band and CRLF classes
Discovery and routesWhat is actually there?
- A crawl of up to 150 pages at depth 4, within a probe budget
- Port, subdomain and endpoint discovery, and WAF detection
- Informational results that describe the target and are never scored
Access and identityWho — and what — can reach what?
- IDOR checks with a second identity in authenticated scans
- CSRF and CORS checks, and a brute-force simulator
Transport and configurationWhat do the connection and headers give away?
- TLS checks
- Security-header and hygiene checks
Secrets and software compositionWhat leaks, and what ships with it?
- Secret-leak detection
- Software-composition checks against a small, stated table
APIs under abuseWhat happens when an API is pushed?
- API fuzzing
- Rate-limit testing
- JSON and NoSQL operator injection
AI-facing endpointsCan a prompt turn the endpoint against its owner?
- A prompt-injection scanner for AI-facing endpoints
- Deeper agent and tool testing is Achilles’s job
Retest and mappingIs it really fixed, and what does it touch?
- Remediation retest: closed, still open or inconclusive
- Findings mapped to NIST 800-53, OWASP 2021, OWASP LLM 2025 and DoD Zero Trust — gaps, never a certificate
- A cached pass is not a retest
Exposure and route graph
Start with what is actually there.
- CustomersEntry point
- Support portalEndpoint
- API gatewayEndpoint
- Gateway logsLogs & delivery
- Agent serviceAgent
- Service identityIdentity
- Repo & pipelineLogs & delivery
- Pipeline secretSecret
- Model providerAttested
- Payments APITool
- Vector storeData
- Second providerUndeclared route
Illustrative system · synthetic data
Coverage manifest
What was expected, observed, assessed — and what was not.
- Expected46
- Declared in the agreed scope.
- Observed48
- Found by discovery — including 2 nobody declared.
- Assessed41
- Tested with a result and evidence.
- Inconclusive3
- Tested, but the evidence does not settle it.
- Not measured4
- Not reached in this run, or out of reach.
Seven observed assets end this run without a result — and the report says so. Coverage fell short, so the audit reads incomplete, never passed.
Every effect, with its authority
Three calls, three boundaries.
Allowed read
Verified$ support-agent → crm.read(customer: C-1042)- Acting for
- Customer C-1042
- Expected
- Allowed — the requester's own record
- Observed
- Allowed · one record returned
Within the requesting customer's scope.
Denied data access
Verified$ support-agent → crm.read(customer: C-2213)- Acting for
- Customer C-1042
- Expected
- Denied — another customer's record
- Observed
- Denied · 403 at the CRM
The tenant boundary held for this route.
Held high-risk action
Held$ support-agent → payments.refund(amount: $4,800)- Acting for
- Customer C-1042
- Expected
- Held — above the approval threshold
- Observed
- Held · routed to a human approver
The approval threshold was respected.
Illustrative call traces — synthetic data.
Differential evidence and replay
No baseline, no finding.
Finding
The test differs from its benign control — the evidence shows it.
Inconclusive
Tested, but the evidence does not settle it. Never a pass.
Informational
Describes the target — an open port, an endpoint. Never scored.
Control · the customer’s own invoice
- Signed in as
- Customer A
- Requested
- Invoice 1042 (A’s)
- Status
- 200 OK
- Returned
- Customer A’s invoice
Test · someone else’s invoice
- Signed in as
- Customer A
- Requested
- Changed: Invoice 2213 (B’s)
- Status
- Changed: 200 OK — expected 403
- Returned
- Changed: Customer B’s invoice
Negative control
The same request for the customer's own invoice returns their own record. No baseline, no finding: without this control, Athena reports nothing.
Replay
Both exchanges are re-run from the evidence pack to show the result reproduces under the recorded conditions, and again after the fix.
Evidence pack
Request, response, identity, configuration fingerprint and timestamps, signed with Ed25519 and kept with the limits of the test.
Illustrative exchange. Customers, records and identifiers are fictional.
From finding to SPINE claim
Athena finds. SPINE remembers.
Athena
Finding
Decided against a benign control, with both exchanges.
SPINE
Claim
Bound to the configuration and policy it was true of.
SPINE
Coverage
Expected, observed and assessed — and what was not.
SPINE
Decision
Recalculated when the evidence moves. Your team decides.
Remediation and report outputs
Evidence that survives scrutiny.
Evidence pack
- Both exchanges and the negative control
- Configuration fingerprint and timestamps
- Signed, with stated limitations
Synthetic example
Mapped finding
- Mapped to the controls it bears on
- Dispatched to Jira, GitHub, ServiceNow or Splunk
- Evidence of a gap, never a certificate
Synthetic example
Remediation checklist
- Enforce ownership on invoice lookups
- Add an authorization test to the pipeline
- Retest against the original exchange
Synthetic example
Retest outcomes
- Closed
- The original failure is absent on retest.
- Still open
- The original failure still reproduces.
- Inconclusive
- The retest ran, but the evidence does not settle it.
- Not a retest
- A cached pass, or a scanner switched off, cannot record a fix.
Closed means the original failure is absent on retest — not that every legitimate use still works.
Keep going
Where Athena's evidence goes next.
Mythos AI Security
See your system the way Athena does.
Start with one environment. Athena maps what your AI can reach before anything is tested.

















